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For soldiers such as this one to dominate the battlefield, requires that acquisition professionals maintain the relevant 
skills and expertise, seek diverse career positions, and remain agile and adaptive to the changing acquisition ‘battlefield,’ 
emerging technologies, and fiscal constraints. (U.S. Army/ Shane Hamann)
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Artificial Intelligence  
on the Battlefield 
Implications for Deterrence and Surprise
By Zachary Davis
Artificial intelligence (AI) has burst upon the national security scene with a speed and an intensity surprising even the most veteran observers of the national policy discourse. Factors that have driven this spike of interest include the perception of AI as a revolutionary technology, on par with the 
discovery of fire, electricity, or nuclear weapons; the rapid absorption of nascent AI-based technologies into 
diverse sectors of the U.S. economy, often with transformative effects (as, for example, in the sciences and 
in social media); and the ambitions of potential U.S. adversaries.1 Echoing the 19th-century naval strategist 
Alfred Thayer Mahan (“Whoever rules the waves rules the world”), Russian president Vladimir Putin has 
argued that the nation that rules in AI “will be the ruler of the world.”2 People’s Republic of China President 
Xi Jinping is less outspoken on this matter, but he has committed China to become the dominant AI power by 
2030.3 There are mounting fears of a “Sputnik moment,” which might reveal the United States to be woefully 
underprepared to manage the new AI challenges. If there is an AI arms race, what are the implications for U.S. 
security?4 Could AI disrupt the strategic balance, as blue-water navies and nuclear weapons did in previous 
eras? Might it do so in a manner so severe that deterrence fails and leads to war? If war involving AI-guided 
weapons occurs, can we win?
This article will calibrate the potential risks and rewards of military applications of AI technologies and 
will explore:
■ What military applications are likely in the near term?
■ What are the potential consequences of these applications for strategic stability? 
■ How could AI alter the fundamental calculus of deterrence?
■ How could AI-assisted military systems affect regional stability? Relatedly, what is the connection 
between regional stability and strategic deterrence?
■ What are the risks of unintended consequences and strategic surprise from AI?
Dr. Zachary Davis is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Lab-
oratory and Research Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School. This article draws on a report published by the 
Technology for Global Security and the Center for Global Security Research on February 13, 2019 on “AI and the Military: 
Forever Altering Strategic Stability.” The report was a collaboration of the Center for Global Security Research and the 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
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AI, Big Data, and Machine Learning in 
Science and Business 
Before answering the questions posed above, it is 
useful to recall the state of the art for AI in scientific 
and business applications. Much of the near-hyste-
ria over AI stems from the fuzziness of our view of 
the technologies that combine to make AI. So far, 
at least, the national security community lacks a 
common language for discussing AI and a detailed 
appreciation of the different technologies and the 
timelines by which they might mature into militarily 
significant capabilities.
The term “artificial intelligence” is used to 
describe a range of loosely related phenomena that are 
generally associated with using computers to glean 
insight from “big data.” Much as the generic term 
“cyber” is used in reference to everything from net-
works to hardware, software, automation, industrial 
controls, hacking, bullying, warfare, and all things 
social media, AI is used as a generic term that washes 
over meaningful distinctions between its different 
manifestations. This breeds confusion, especially 
regarding claims about its revolutionary effects. 
For the vast majority of current applications, AI 
consists of algorithms that form the basis of pat-
tern recognition software. When combined with 
high-performance computing power, data scien-
tists are able to probe and find meaning in massive 
data collections. Neural networks supercharge the 
ability of the algorithms to identify and organize 
patterns in the data by “training” them to associate 
specific patterns with desired outcomes. Multiple 
layers of neural networks, known as deep learning 
neural networks, are what make current approaches 
to “machine learning,” “supervised learning,” and 
“reinforcement learning” possible.5 However, the 
neural network approach portrays only a fraction 
of the advancements in AI methods. For example, 
AI also includes language processing, knowledge 
representation, and inferential reasoning, which 
are all increasingly possible due to advancements in 
software, hardware, data collection, and data stor-
age. AI represents a quantum leap in the ability to 
find needles in data haystacks—as long as you know 
what you are looking for.
It is useful to distinguish between narrow 
and general applications of AI. Narrow AI encom-
passes discrete problemsolving tools designed to 
perform specific narrow tasks. General AI encom-
passes technologies designed to mimic and recreate 
functions of the human brain. The gap between the 
two is significant. Most experts appear to agree that 
the accomplishments of narrow AI, though quite 
significant, are a long way from the requirements of 
replicating human-like reasoning as envisioned by 
proponents of general AI. Although IBM’s Watson, 
Google’s DeepMind, and other such experiments 
have made breakthroughs in replicating human-
like reasoning, they are far from being able to 
reliably replicate the performance of the human 
brain in its multiple dimensions. It is not surpris-
ing, however, that the human imagination has been 
captured by the prospect of what futurists have 
called “The Singularity”—a point in time when “we 
will multiply our effective intelligence a billion fold 
by merging with the intelligence we have created.”6 
The quest for “superintelligence” notwithstand-
ing, recent progress in brain enhancement for now 
mostly replenishes impaired functions7 and has a 
long way to go before it is possible to equip citizens, 
soldiers, or robots with superhuman powers.8 
Although general AI stimulates intriguing 
science fiction about cyborgs, space wars, and robot 
armies, narrow AI is already here—and has been 
for some time. In both business and science, AI has 
wide applications, primarily in data-rich research 
fields, including fundamental research (for exam-
ple, in physics, chemistry, and biology) and applied 
sciences (medicine, aeronautics, and environmental 
studies). Data science is facilitating rapid advance-
ments in every aspect of scientific discovery, even 
changing long-held methodological standards and 
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practices.9 Figure 1 highlights some of the scientific 
areas where AI-fueled deep learning is having its 
greatest effect. 
The crossover of AI into business applications 
has supercharged predictive analytics for mar-
ket research, consumer behavior, logistics, quality 
control, and many other data-rich areas. The pro-
liferation of cameras and sensors creates even more 
opportunities for data analysis. When combined 
with robotics, AI is ushering in a new industrial 
age, with far-reaching societal implications for labor 
and management.10 For these types of applications, 
however, AI is more of a well-established, sustaining, 
and enabling technology than a revolutionary new 
disruptive technology in its own right. Data analyt-
ics is not new, but it is getting better. 
For these scientific and business applications, 
AI is an enabling technology, a cross-cutting force 
multiplier when coupled with existing data-centric 
systems, such as the internet, health care, social 
media, industrial processes, transportation, and 
just about every aspect of the global economy, 
where recognizing patterns is the key to insight and 
profit. Growing interconnectivity, illustrated by the 
Internet of Things (IOT), is producing more data 
and providing more opportunity for AI algorithms 
to reveal hidden insights. 
What Military Applications are 
Likely in the Near Term? Tactical and 
Strategic Effects 
Should we expect similarly important AI appli-
cations in the military field? Like so many 
technologies, AI is loaded with latent military poten-
tial.11 Many see algorithmic warfare as the prime 
mover of a new revolution in military affairs.12 AI 
was central to the so-called Third Offset Strategy 
pursued by the Department of Defense (DOD) in 
Theory and Scientific Knowledge
Low-Power Algorithms
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FIGURE 1. Disciplinary Areas of Deep Learning for Scientific Discovery at the Pacific North-
west National Laboratory.
Source. Nathan Hodas, Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning to Accelerate Translational Research: Proceedings of a 
Workshop in Brief, National Academies Press (July 2018), <http://nap.edu/25197>.
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the second Obama Administration and thus was 
a principal focus of multiple government initia-
tives to accelerate the development of advanced 
technologies.13 In June 2018, DOD established its 
Joint Artificial Intelligence Center and issued its 
Artificial Intelligence Strategy in February 2019.14 
The White House established its Select Committee 
on AI in May 2018 and released its Executive Order 
on Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial 
Intelligence in parallel with the DOD Strategy, 
also in February 2019.15 DOD and Intelligence 
Community spending on AI has increased sub-
stantially.16 For military applications with direct 
analogs in the civilian world, like logistics, planning, 
and transportation, AI-supported data analyt-
ics is already in use throughout the defense and 
intelligence communities.17 These applications are 
separate and distinct from applications to warfight-
ing, which tend to fall into one of two categories: 
ones having impact primarily at the tactical/opera-
tional level of war, and those that also have impact 
at the strategic level of war. Tactical or operational 
effects stem from the way wars are fought—includ-
ing specific weapons and organizational concepts. 
We define “strategic” as “extraordinarily consequen-
tial actions capable of causing a shift in the balance 
of power.”18 The strategic level refers primarily to 
major conflict between great powers. It is possible, 
however, for actions at the operational level to spill 
over and have effects at the strategic level.
AI Applications at the Tactical/
Operational Level of War 
The process of managing and making sense of 
the staggering amount of intelligence, surveil-
lance, and reconnaissance (ISR) data involved in 
modern warfare is a natural fit for AI and is the 
objective of DOD’s Project Maven, also known 
as the Algorithmic Warfare Cross Functional 
Team.19 According to Lieutenant General Jack 
Shanahan, former Director of Defense Intelligence 
for Warfighter Support, Project Maven was con-
ceived as “the spark that kindles the flame front for 
artificial intelligence across the rest of the depart-
ment.”20 While Maven’s initial mission was to 
help locate Islamic State fighters, its implications 
are vast. Multidomain warfare involves colossal 
amounts of heterogenous data streams that can 
only be exploited with the help of AI. Mirroring 
the proliferation of sensors in the civilian world, 
the multidomain, hybrid warfare battlefield has 
become a military version of the IoT, teeming with 
vital information for assessing tactical and strate-
gic threats and opportunities. While the ability to 
manage this data colossus in real time portends tre-
mendous advantages, failure to draw meaning from 
that information could spell disaster. 
Being able to rapidly process the flood of infor-
mation from varied platforms operating in multiple 
domains translates into two fundamental mili-
tary advantages—speed and range. Moving faster 
than your adversary enhances offensive mobility 
and makes you harder to hit. Striking from far-
ther away similarly benefits the element of surprise 
and minimizes exposure to enemy fire. These were 
central tenets of the previous revolution in military 
affairs that had its debut in the Gulf War. AI makes 
it possible to analyze dynamic battlefield conditions 
in real time and strike quickly and optimally while 
minimizing risks to one’s own forces.
Omnipresent and Omniscient  
Autonomous Vehicles 
The new generation of autonomous vehicles is a high 
priority for military applications of AI, with much of 
the focus on navigation for a variety of unmanned 
land, sea, and air systems.21 Space and undersea plat-
forms will also benefit from AI-informed guidance 
systems. AI is at the heart of the so-called drone 
swarms that have been the subject of much attention 
in recent years.22 AI-informed navigation software 
supported by ubiquitous sensors not only enables 
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unmanned vehicles to find their way through hostile 
terrain, but also may eventually make it possible 
for complex formations of various types of drones 
operating in multiple domains, with complementary 
armaments to conduct sophisticated battle tactics, 
instantly adjusting to enemy maneuvers to exploit 
battlefield opportunities and report changing condi-
tions. Autonomous vehicles and robotics are poised 
to revolutionize warfare.
As a recent Defense Science Board Study demon-
strated, integrated battle management, command, 
control, communications, and intelligence (BMC3I) 
capabilities are well suited to finding and targeting 
deployed missile batteries, and thus could be the key 
to countering critical elements of the anti-access/area 
denial (A2AD) strategies of Russia and China.23 These 
systems were designed to exploit vulnerabilities of 
U.S. land and sea assets in Europe and Asia. In addi-
tion to geolocating targets, AI-enabled BMC3I could 
help guide and coordinate kinetic effects involving 
multiple platforms, possibly providing a counter to 
current adversary A2AD. From this perspective, the 
cumulative effects of tactical-level AI could become a 
strategic-level game changer. 
Big Data–Driven Modeling, Simulation,  
and Wargaming 
AI has steadily been increasing the power of simu-
lations and gaming tools used to study nuclear and 
conventional weapons. From Samuel Glasstone’s 
early calculations of nuclear effects to the extensive 
library of RAND studies on nuclear issues, quantita-
tive methods have been integral to the development 
of nuclear weapons systems. 
AI is enabling scientists to model nuclear effects 
to confirm the reliability of the nuclear stockpile 
without nuclear testing. Simulation and modeling 
is already a key part of the design process for nearly 
all major weapons systems, from jets and ships 
to spacecraft and precision-guided munitions.24 
Massive modeling and simulation will be necessary 
to design the all-encompassing multidomain system 
of systems envisioned for battle management and 
complex missions such as designing, planning, and 
managing systems for space situational awareness. 
On the production side, AI already informs quality 
control for novel production methods, such as addi-
tive manufacturing.25 
AI is also enriching battlefield simulations and 
wargames involving multi-actor interactions. AI 
enables wargamers to add and modify game vari-
ables to explore how dynamic conditions (weapons, 
effects, allies, intervention, and so forth) could affect 
outcomes and decisionmaking. AI is used to analyze 
the results of such games.26 These are examples of 
evolutionary learning that are unlikely to cause 
strategic surprise or undermine stability unless the 
results negatively influence decisionmaking.
Focused Intelligence Collection and Analysis 
With so many incoming streams of intelligence 
(human, signals, open-source, measurement and 
signatures, geospatial, electronic) being collected, 
all requiring analysis to be useful for policymakers, 
the Intelligence Community faces the challenge 
of information overload.27 This is a data-centric 
problem for which AI and machine learning are 
well suited.28 For example, a project at Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory uses neural net-
works to probe multimodal data sets (images, text, 
and video) in search of key indicators of prolif-
eration activity. Machine learning also makes 
it possible to combine open-source trade and 
financial data with multiple forms of intelligence 
to glean insights about illicit technology transfers, 
proliferation networks, and the efforts of prolif-
erators to evade detection.29 These insights enable 
analysts to inform policymakers and support coun-
terproliferation policy and actions. 
Machine learning will be an important tool for 
all-source analysts who are increasingly required to 
take into account information from many sources, 
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locations, and disciplines to understand today’s 
global security environment. To the extent that 
better information leads to informed decisions, 
applying AI to these collection and analysis prob-
lems would benefit strategic stability.
AI Applications with Implications for 
the Strategic Level of War 
Some military applications of AI appear to have 
broader implications beyond the battlefield. AI that 
makes it possible to locate and target strategic assets 
could alter the logic of strategic deterrence. 
A System of Systems Enabling Exquisite ISR 
For the military, object identification is a natural 
starting point for AI, as it requires culling images 
and information collected from satellites and 
drones to find things of military importance such 
as missiles, troops, and intelligence information. 
Accordingly, the National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency has led the charge in applying AI to military 
and intelligence needs.30 But object identification is 
just the beginning. Intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) is the key to multidomain 
situational awareness. This awareness is increasingly 
critical as the battlefield extends to all domains—
sea, land, air, space, and cyber on a global scale. 
Precision Targeting of Strategic Assets 
AI-empowered ISR that makes it possible to locate, 
track, and target a variety of enemy weapons 
systems raises the possibility of striking strategic 
assets, such as aircraft carriers, mobile missiles, or 
nuclear weapons. This capability, and perceptions 
of its existence, could disrupt long-held assump-
tions about deterrence stability, especially if it 
appeared possible to conduct a disarming coun-
terforce strike against an adversary’s retaliatory 
forces.31 The combination of offensive weapons 
that can “find, fix, and finish” a significant portion 
of an adversary’s strategic assets, with defensive 
systems that can shoot down remaining retaliatory 
capabilities, could challenge fundamental precepts 
of deterrence based on mutual vulnerability.32 
Effective Missile Defense 
Advancements in AI-enhanced targeting and nav-
igation also improve prospects for a wide range of 
tactical and strategic defense systems, especially 
ballistic missile defenses, by empowering target 
acquisition, tracking, and discrimination.33 The 
convergence of powerful new offensive and defen-
sive capabilities has, however, rekindled fears of a 
surprise attack that could rattle strategic stability.
AI-Guided Cyber 
As an inherently digital domain, the cyber realm 
naturally lends itself to AI applications, as illustrated 
by the centrality of AI algorithms for social media 
titans such as Google and Facebook. The availability 
of enormous amounts of data in electronic formats 
is well suited to AI strengths. AI-guided probing, 
The Director of National Intelligence’s worldwide threat 
assessment in January asserted that “…The global race 
to develop artificial intelligence (AI)—systems that imitate 
aspects of human cognition—is likely to accelerate the 
development of highly capable, application-specific AI 
systems with national security implications.” (DNI)
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mapping, and hacking of computer networks can 
provide useful data for machine learning, including 
discovery of network vulnerabilities, identities, pro-
files, relationships, and other information that could 
be valuable for offensive and defense purposes.34 
Chinese applications of AI for surveillance purposes 
illustrate broad concerns about its implications for 
privacy and democracy. 
On the offensive side, AI could help locate and 
target particular nodes or individual accounts for 
collection, disruption, or disinformation. Cyber 
attacks on national command infrastructure and 
networks, for example, could be catastrophic.35 On 
the defensive side of the equation, AI can help detect 
such intrusions and search for debilitating anom-
alies in civilian and military operating systems.36 
AI will equally empower offensive and defensive 
measures, both of which could have positive and 
negative strategic effects.
Potential Consequences of these 
Applications for Strategic Stability 
AI has multiple potential applications in the military 
domain at both the operational and strategic levels 
of war. But at the strategic level, some of the impli-
cations may not be altogether positive, as already 
foreshadowed. Indeed, the disruptive effects of new 
technologies cannot be limited to the adversary. 
Some of those effects are potentially quite significant 
for strategic stability. How might this be so?
The Enemy Has AI Too 
No one country can gain all of the benefits of AI while 
denying them to potential adversaries. Competition 
to gain advantage will bring uncertainty about the 
future balance. Russia, China, and other nations’ 
advancements in these same AI-enabled technolo-
gies have the potential to shift the strategic calculus 
as well, especially in regional contexts. For example, 
while Russian and Chinese A2AD systems designed 
to defeat U.S. regional forces may reduce U.S. allies’ 
confidence in American security guarantees to 
protect them, the ability of the United States to 
defeat those A2AD systems with AI-accelerated ISR, 
BMC3I, defensive systems, and autonomous vehicles 
would demonstrate resolve and provide opportuni-
ties for joint U.S.-allied defense cooperation, thereby 
enhancing stability and deterrence. Reinforcing 
regional conventional deterrence is also an essential 
part of strategic stability.37 However, even the percep-
tion of an imbalance that favors striking first can lead 
to misperception, miscalculation, and arms racing. 
Whatever advantages can be attained with AI are 
likely to evoke countermeasures that mitigate tem-
porary unilateral advantages. Russian and Chinese 
interest in hypersonic vehicles and counterspace 
operations may fall into this category. 
Data Is Fragile . . . 
AI systems are vulnerable to flawed data inputs, 
which can cause unintended consequences. In her 
book Weapons of Math Destruction, data scientist 
Cathy O’Neil demonstrates how AI logarithms 
distort reality and lead to incorrect, misleading, 
and unjust decisions.38 Perhaps the biggest obstacle 
to increasing reliance on AI is the age-old problem 
of data reliability. AI can magnify the “garbage in, 
garbage out” problem.39 Data comes from many 
places and is not always carefully collected or 
curated. Compounding the problems with the data 
itself leading to skewed results, AI often reflects 
human bias.40 Computer vision—the AI-informed 
object and pattern recognition software behind 
Project Maven and many other applications—is 
easily fooled by misleading data.41 Differentiating 
between similar objects is difficult and more chal-
lenging with denial and deception campaigns, such 
as the use of camouflage and decoys.42 Even when 
data seems accurate, AI sometimes “hallucinates” 
things that do not exist.43 Transferring these inher-
ent problems of data reliability and interpretation 
onto the battlefield raises critical questions about 
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the safety and reliability that come with the desir-
able qualities of speed and lethality. Accidentally 
hitting the wrong targets, for example, could have 
strategic consequences. 
. . . And Easily Manipulated 
Countering many AI applications can be simple 
and straightforward. Adversarial manipulation 
of data provides many opportunities for mischief 
and mistakes.44 The fact that AI is easily deceived 
invites efforts to counter the sought-after military 
benefits.45 By corrupting data in calculated ways, 
it may be possible to cause catastrophic equipment 
failures, miscommunication, confusion, logistical 
nightmares, and devastating mistakes in AI-reliant 
systems. The “black box” problem of not under-
standing how and why AI makes decisions also 
means that it would be hard to recognize if data had 
been compromised to produce inaccurate outcomes, 
such as hitting the wrong targets or misdirecting 
U.S. and allied forces. The vulnerability of data 
could be the Achilles’ heel of AI. 
Faster is Not Always Better 
Speedy decisionmaking and operational execu-
tion may not serve well the goals of effective crisis 
management. On October 19, 1962, only three days 
into the Cuban Missile Crisis, General Curtis LeMay 
counseled President John F. Kennedy, “I just don’t 
see any other solution except direct military action 
right now.”46 Ten days later, the crisis was resolved 
diplomatically. If one of the advantages of AI is the 
speed it adds to decisionmaking, that same speed 
could be a disadvantage if it accelerates the escala-
tion of conflict from crisis to war and even potential 
nuclear confrontation.47 The battlefield advantages 
of AI-driven ISR and autonomous systems could 
shrink the time available for diplomacy to avoid or 
manage crises. As currently conceived, AI-driven 
battlefield systems would not include real-time 
reporting and analysis of national and international 
diplomatic efforts to avoid, control, contain, or end 
a conflict—violating Clausewitz’s principle of war 
as “the continuation of politics by other means.” 
In many cases, logic might dictate striking first, as 
General LeMay advised. Accelerated decisionmak-
ing might have pushed the Cuban Missile Crisis 
toward different outcomes. In practice, slowing 
things down can be the key to victory, especially 
when the stakes involve nuclear weapons. 
Many of the positive regional deterrence effects 
that could eventually result from an integrated ISR, 
defense, and battle management complex might not 
be attainable, at least not in the near term. The over-
arching architecture and strategy for complex new 
AI-guided ISR/battle management systems do not yet 
exist. In fact, a proliferation of AI systems may actu-
ally complicate one of the main problems confronting 
U.S. military forces—effective joint operations.
Systems of Systems of Systems 
AI-supported weapons, platforms, and operating 
systems operate according to custom-built soft-
ware and hardware that is specifically designed 
for each separate system and purpose. There is 
currently no overarching mechanism to integrate 
scores of AI-powered systems operating on multiple 
platforms.48 To achieve the desired effects of multi-
domain ISR, it is necessary to integrate across scores 
of sensors, radars, weapons, and communications 
systems operating in multiple geophysical domains. 
If this were not challenging enough, those systems 
would be built and operated by different agencies, 
commands, and contractors, with different authori-
ties, access, and procedures. Adding allies with their 
own AI systems to this landscape brings further 
complexity and risk. Without seamless integration, 
the hoped-for benefits of speed and lethality could 
be fleeting, and the credibility of such an unproven 
system of systems could be called into question. 
Massively complex and unproven capabilities could 
invite challenges that could be destabilizing. 
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Strategic Warning Requires More than Data 
Big data and machine learning might not solve the 
challenge of strategic warning. Designing a multi-
plex of AI-informed platforms that have the ability 
to communicate in real time requires a new gen-
eration of data fusion, integrative software, and 
command architectures. Pulling all these pieces 
together to develop a holistic threat assessment that 
provides policymakers with strategic warning will 
not happen naturally. Instead, this task will require 
Herculean efforts to collect and analyze informa-
tion “owned” by diverse stakeholders with different 
classification systems, analytic roles, and customer 
loyalties. Integrating and analyzing sensitive infor-
mation from diverse sources is already a challenge, 
especially if it needs to be done quickly. Moreover, 
while machine learning, computer vision, and other 
techniques will help sort and prioritize the flood of 
intelligence information, analysts will still have to 
make judgments based on incomplete and some-
times unreliable information. Developing a fully 
integrated system capable of providing strategic 
warning will take many years. 
AI Unpredictability 
The close operation and integration of multiple 
AI systems, as required on the battlefield, can be 
expected to have unanticipated results, some of which 
could have strategic consequences. The flip side of 
stovepiped systems not talking to each other is the 
issue of unexpected convergences. It is uncertain 
how separate AI-infused platforms might interact 
with one another, as various AI-guided systems 
operate in shared battlespace. Unknown outcomes 
resulting from friendly interactions are likely to be 
compounded by interactions with foreign AI sys-
tems. With so much uncertainty about the internal 
“black box” mechanisms that produce AI outcomes, 
AI-to-AI interactions are likely to produce unan-
ticipated and unexplainable results— for example, 
choosing the wrong targets.49 Lastly, we cannot 
anticipate how AI will converge with other technol-
ogies, such as quantum computing, electromagnetic 
pulses, Internet of Things, 5G, or blockchain/distrib-
uted ledgers. Potential convergences could produce 
strategic surprises that confuse and confound friends 
and foes alike, making the fog of war even more 
impenetrable and increasing the risks of escalation. 
Who Is In the AI Loop? 
Whether or not there are humans in every part 
of the decisionmaking loop, that loop is getting 
crowded. The interface between humans and 
machines—where the proverbial “person in the loop” 
is supposed to exert human control— also raises crit-
ical questions about decisionmaking authority and 
organizational hierarchies.50 Within the military, 
questions of rank, service branch, and responsibil-
ity for lethal actions can be contentious in the best 
of times, as illustrated by the debates over authority 
for U.S. drone strikes.51 Deconflicting military and 
intelligence missions will not be made easier. With 
scores of AI-informed battlefield systems operating 
at breakneck speed, each connected to its own chain 
of command, coordination among the humans who 
are in the loop of fast-moving battlefield operations 
spanning multiple adversaries, domains, agencies, 
clearance levels, contractors, allies, and organiza-
tional cultures will be challenging, especially if the 
goal is to maintain offensive advantage via speedy 
decisionmaking. Budgets, reorganizations, accesses, 
personalities, and leadership changes may have as 
much influence over AI capabilities as the technol-
ogy itself. There will be lots of men and women in the 
loop in lots of places, each influencing how AI con-
tributes to separate and shared objectives. Achieving 
strategic effects will require extraordinary coopera-
tion and communication. 
Fake Nuclear News  
Public perception is a giant wildcard. AI algo-
rithms are a central component of cyber influence 
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operations aimed at shaping public perceptions. By 
now, it should be understood that the use and misuse 
of electronic media to manipulate public perceptions, 
including the use of fake news, cyber bots, and deep 
fakes, can affect strategic stability.52 How the public 
views particular international conflicts can shape 
leadership decisionmaking and can build or under-
mine support for issues of war and peace, especially 
in democratic states. Decisions to escalate conflict 
could be influenced by public attitudes. AI-powered 
tools such as cyber bots and deep fake technology 
could enrage or pacify public opinion or mislead 
decisionmakers. Now that cyber conflict has become 
an ingrained feature of the international landscape, 
we should expect manipulation of public perceptions 
to affect crisis management, escalation, deterrence 
stability, and possibly nuclear decisionmaking. 
Close Is Not Good Enough 
Decisions of war and peace cannot be left to 
predictive analytics. There are fundamental dif-
ferences in the ways that data is used for scientific, 
economic, and logistic purposes and for predicting 
human behavior. Machine learning cannot reliably 
predict the outcomes of sports contests, elections, 
or international conflict, at least within accept-
able margins of error for making big decisions 
involving questions of war and peace. Despite 
longstanding interest in predictive analytics that 
can tell decisionmakers what to expect before it 
happens, faith in the ability to predict incidents 
or outcomes of war and conflict based on big data 
machine learning is fraught with misplaced opti-
mism.53 Much like self-driving cars, where AI can 
correctly assess most—but not all—situations, a 90 
percent success rate could mislead decisionmakers 
and put soldiers’ and citizens’ lives at stake. All of 
the potential dangers stemming from unreliable 
(outdated, biased, compromised) data, machine 
learning bias, and interpretation errors are magni-
fied when human emotions, nonrational behavior, 
and inherent unpredictability cloud the data and 
the decisionmaking. The result is wider margins 
of error, which may be acceptable for research pur-
poses but do not satisfy the practical and ethical 
demands of national security decisionmaking. 
Close is not good enough when it comes to war, 
especially where nuclear risks are involved. 
Crowdsourcing Armageddon? 
Lastly, public–private partnerships shape the future 
of AI—but war remains the preserve of the state. As 
a quintessentially dual-use technology, AI is freely 
available to everyone. It is being developed and 
applied beyond the reach of governmental controls. 
Like many other dual-use technologies, govern-
ments rely on the private sector for the underlying 
research and development, software, hardware, and 
expertise required for AI to be used for military 
purposes. DOD and the Intelligence Community 
have deep ties to Silicon Valley and have doubled 
down on efforts to expedite the acquisitions process, 
especially for cyber and AI.54 Competition among 
nations to secure AI talent could have strategic 
implications, especially with respect to counter-
intelligence, intellectual property, and respect for 
international norms of behavior. 
America’s Got Talent 
What this means in practice is that many countries 
will use the same experts, companies, and global 
supply chains to support their military AI aspira-
tions, creating potential competitive conflicts of 
interest and security vulnerabilities related to sharing 
intellectual property. This dynamic is already evident 
in cyber markets, where Google and other companies 
have found it advantageous to accommodate Chinese 
government practices on censorship and surveillance 
while simultaneously expressing political opposi-
tion to supporting U.S. military AI projects such as 
Project Maven.55 Global technology companies will 
have to weigh the costs and benefits of serving some 
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national customers while keeping others at arm’s 
length. The U.S. Government, however, has little 
choice but to remain heavily dependent on the pri-
vate sector to develop and implement AI strategies.56 
Such dependence could have strategic implications if 
it interferes with our ability to compete for top talent 
and cutting-edge capabilities. 
How Could AI Alter the Fundamental 
Calculus of Deterrence? 
In the classic Cold War movie WarGames, a 
young hacker breaks into a DOD supercomputer 
designed to use AI to plan and execute nuclear war 
plans. He engages the computer to play “Global 
Thermonuclear War” and accidentally triggers a 
simulated scenario of nuclear Armageddon, which is 
mistaken for the real thing. The computer ultimately 
learns that for nuclear deterrence, “the only way to 
win is not to play.” If AI disrupts the central logic 
of nuclear deterrence as understood by the nuclear 
powers or fundamentally changes the underlying 
precepts that support it, the strategic consequences 
could be far-reaching, and the prospects that com-
puters will learn “not to play” uncertain. 
With these potential strategic impacts in mind, 
how could AI alter the fundamental calculus of 
deterrence? How might the convergence of the tac-
tically and strategically relevant factors discussed 
above affect the strategic balance?
AI Is Changing Perceptions About the Threat of 
Surprise Attack 
At the top of the list of AI applications that could have 
true strategic significance for deterrence strategy is the 
threat of surprise attack. The combination of effective 
defenses with exquisite ISR that makes it possible to 
locate mobile targets and strike them with speed and 
precision raises long-held fears of an AI-guided “bolt 
from the blue” first strike. While the fundamental 
logic of deterrence is unchanged, perceptions that 
an adversary has sufficient intent and capability to 
conduct such a preemptive attack on vital assets can be 
expected to motivate a variety of countermeasures. 
Evaluating the incentive to strike first evokes 
memories of Pearl Harbor, in which the United States 
underestimated Japan’s risk calculus while fully 
recognizing Tokyo’s military capacity to launch a 
cross-Pacific raid. AI contributions to military and 
intelligence capabilities do not override political con-
siderations—with an important caveat added for the 
possibility of AI-fueled manipulation of public atti-
tudes that could distort political judgment. Avoiding 
and deterring conflict remain a paramount respon-
sibility for national leaders. Slightly improved odds 
of eliminating all but a few of an adversary’s strategic 
weapons and shooting down any surviving retalia-
tion with missile defenses still involves catastrophic 
risks and does not even begin to answer questions 
about the aftermath of such a conflict. 
Nevertheless, possessing the theoretical capa-
bility to conduct a disarming first strike inevitably 
triggers a classic security dilemma, which is guar-
anteed to provoke countermeasures from those 
threatened by enhanced striking power. Further 
advances in defenses against counterforce strikes 
would be a predictable response, as well as harden-
ing and camouflage to evade and confuse exquisite 
ISR. To the extent that AI influences perceptions 
of intent and capability and alters the calculus of 
risk and reward, it will inspire new thinking about 
possible offensive and defensive maneuvers in the 
evolution of nuclear strategy.57 
Farewell to Mutual Vulnerability?
Some may see AI as eroding mutual strategic vul-
nerability and thereby as increasing the risk of war. 
The combination of exquisite ISR with an effective 
defensive shield could make it tempting to conduct 
a disarming, decapitating, or blinding first strike 
at strategic targets, including nuclear command, 
control, and communications (NC3), early warn-
ing radars, or dual-capable missiles and aircraft.58 
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Such a revision of deterrence logic could be highly 
destabilizing. Shared vulnerability and assured 
retaliation are central concepts of mutually assured 
destruction (MAD) deterrence theory. Switching 
the theoretical incentive from MAD to improve 
the odds of successfully conducting a disarming 
first strike could change the risk calculus that has 
formed the basis of strategic stability for decades.59 
Preventing such a revision of nuclear deterrence 
logic was the essence of Russia President Vladimir 
Putin’s claim in March 2018 that his new weapons 
are “invincible against all existing and prospective 
missile defense and counter-air defense sys-
tems.”60 By evading perceived U.S. global strike and 
missile defense capabilities, Putin’s claims about 
new AI-guided retaliatory forces were justified as 
efforts to preserve MAD.
AI Is Poised to Alter Regional Stability in Asia 
and Europe 
How could AI-assisted weapons systems affect 
regional stability, including U.S. allies? Widespread 
deployment of AI-supported ISR platforms is likely 
to affect regional stability in the five- to ten-year 
time frame. While the United States remains the 
leader in translating AI to currently deployed 
platforms, China and Russia are not far behind.61 
Many U.S. allies are rapidly advancing their own 
AI capabilities. Initially, the speed and lethality 
gained from AI-informed situational awareness and 
battle management systems are likely to provide the 
United States and its allies with options for counter-
ing Russian and Chinese A2AD. 
The coming architecture of ISR, BMC3I, and 
defense systems appears well positioned to give 
net advantages to U.S. and allied regional security 
alliances. In addition to tactical military benefits, 
co-development of multidomain ISR provides oppor-
tunities for collaboration that directly addresses 
threats to allied security, especially with respect to 
extended deterrence relationships with key allies 
in Asia and Europe. Strengthening regional con-
ventional deterrence and regional extended nuclear 
deterrence reduces incentives for risk taking and 
supports broader interests in strategic deterrence. AI 
applications that support these objectives will have 
beneficial effects for strategic stability. 
AI Competition Could Also Benefit Strategic 
Stability and Bolster Deterrence 
Global competition in military AI is already heating 
up. An AI arms race is under way. Whatever advan-
tages are possible in the near term, however, may be 
short-lived as U.S. allies, major adversaries, and a 
multitude of rising powers incorporate AI into their 
political and military strategies. In light of the rising 
tide that is advancing AI prospects around the world, 
temporary advantages are unlikely to yield lasting 
military predominance. For example, China and 
Russia will eventually possess their own versions of 
multidomain ISR coupled with precision strike and 
layered defenses. How will these capabilities influ-
ence Beijing’s thinking about the U.S. role in the 
South China Sea, or Russian assessments of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization’s defense of the Baltics? 
These are not primarily technical issues. AI 
is enhancing the performance of many tactical 
and strategic systems but is not giving definitive 
unilateral advantage to any one. The nature of war-
fare is changing, and AI is fueling many of those 
changes, but the fundamental calculus of deter-
rence remains steady. Competition for military 
capabilities that retains a balance of power can be 
stabilizing. 
Risks of Unintended Consequences 
and Strategic Surprise 
Predicting the future of technology is a risky 
business. We know with certainty that AI is being 
incorporated into an array of military missions 
with the intent of improving our knowledge of the 
operational environment, adversary capabilities, 
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and the speed and precision of offensive and defen-
sive weapons. We can usefully speculate about how 
these developments are poised to change the face 
of modern warfare and how those changes might 
affect regional and strategic deterrence stability, 
based on our understanding of established political 
and military realities. More elusive, however, is a 
clear picture of how AI might converge with other 
technologies to produce unexpected outcomes, or 
“unknown unknowns.” Nevertheless, here are a few 
possibilities that could have major strategic conse-
quences and alter the underlying realities on which 
regional and strategic stability are founded: 
■ Distorted data could lead AI systems to take 
unintended actions, such as incorrectly iden-
tifying and striking the wrong targets. Data 
can be polluted intentionally via counter-AI 
methods or can occur naturally for many rea-
sons. Such actions could hasten escalation and 
interfere with conflict management efforts.
■ Compounding the problems of distorted data, 
AI makes mistakes with a frequency that 
could be untenable for decisions affecting stra-
tegic stability. Misinterpretations of data that 
lead to unintended actions could spark highly 
undesirable reactions, including escalation 
and retaliation. 
■ The convergence of AI and cyber presents sev-
eral possibilities for unintended consequences 
and strategic surprise. AI-informed cyber 
attacks on NC3 could present the target of such 
an attack with a “use it or lose it” situation, 
prompting early resort to nuclear weapons. 
■ AI-supported cyber/information warfare, 
including use of fake news, deep fakes, and 
other methods could distort public and lead-
ership perceptions of international events, 
inflaming passions and prompting escalation. 
■ Accelerated battle rhythm made possible by 
multidomain ISR could preclude diplomatic 
efforts to avoid or deescalate conflict. Even if 
AI works perfectly to increase the speed and 
lethality of warfare, moving at the speed of AI 
might not be optimal for all cases.
■ Unpredictable AI interactions with foreign and 
friendly platforms could produce unwanted AI 
calculations that misrepresent human intentions. 
The “black box” underlying AI decisions is not 
well understood and could produce destabilizing 
results, such as striking the wrong targets. 
■ Unexpected convergences with other tech-
nologies, such as quantum computing and 
electromagnetic pulse, could confuse/distort 
offensive or defensive instructions and lead 
to undesirable results, such as striking the 
wrong targets. 
■ If it were eventually possible through a vari-
ety of AI-supported information gathering 
methods, emerging technologies, and analytic 
tools to track strategic assets such as subma-
rines, the sanctity of assured retaliation could 
come into question. Such a strategic surprise 
could prompt a variety of destabilizing actions, 
including possible movement toward launch on 
warning postures. 
AI Is Part of a Bigger Challenge for 
Deterrence, Stability, and Strategy 
Evolutionary changes in the logic of regional and 
strategic deterrence are not new, nor are they nec-
essarily harmful to U.S. national security. Efforts to 
integrate AI-based technologies into U.S. defense 
and intelligence strategies illustrate the continued 
innovation and competitive advantages sought in 
support of U.S. national security policy. Applications 
of AI that support U.S. nuclear forces and infra-
structure, such as command and control, logistics, 
and stockpile stewardship, serve to reinforce stra-
tegic deterrence by bolstering the survivability and 
credibility of our retaliatory forces. 
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AI that bolsters tactical/battlefield appli-
cations can also support strategic deterrence, 
especially in a regional context. The connection 
between regional and strategic deterrence has 
always been important and appears to be even 
more tightly coupled as increased speed, precision, 
and lethality at the tactical level hold the potential 
to produce military outcomes that could escalate 
to the strategic level of conflict. Specifically, failure 
to deter Chinese or Russian aggression against U.S. 
regional allies that results in armed conflict may 
be hard to contain, especially if early victories on 
the battlefield leave one side facing a humiliating 
defeat. The United States and its allies still main-
tain conventional superiority, and AI is likely to 
extend those advantages in the near term to defeat 
Russian and Chinese A2AD. Rather than accept 
defeat, Russia or China might choose an “escalate 
to de-escalate” strategy that includes use of nuclear 
or other unconventional weapons to mitigate the 
technological advantages held by the United States 
and its allies, including AI-supported ISR, bat-
tle management, and defenses. For the military 
applications of AI to advance U.S. national security 
objectives, they must be integrated into a broader 
strategy that reinforces deterrence at the regional 
and strategic levels. 
The rapid expansion of AI’s military applica-
tions throughout the world merits a high level of 
focused attention to ensure maximum advantage for 
the United States and its allies, to minimize its neg-
ative impacts on strategic stability, and to prevent 
strategic surprise. PRISM
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